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IN MAY 1998, JOURNALIST Daniel LeBlanc of the Ottawa Citizen created something
of a stir when he published a series of articles exposing “Canada’s plan to torch
St. John’s” during the Second World War. LeBlanc based this claim on the then
newly declassified documents which supposedly revealed that, in the event of an
invasion, military authorities planned to burn St. John’s to the ground rather than let
the Germans occupy it. Indeed, the centrepiece of the plan was, apparently, to dump
the fuel in the large tanks overlooking St. John’s into the harbour and ignite it. This
would produce, “a mushroom of fire and smoke over the city,” and transform St.
John’s into a “version of hell.” Even more scurrilous, according to Leblanc, neither
the Newfoundland public nor their government was to be informed until the very
last moment.
1
Not surprisingly, the Ottawa Citizen articles, reprinted in the St.
John’s Evening Telegram, caused an uproar in Newfoundland’s capital city.
2
St.
John’s mayor Andy Wells, a self-avowed anti-Confederate, considered it “Upper-
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Canadian arrogance at its best.”
3
Well-known Newfoundland historian Patrick
O’Flaherty suggested that it was typical of Canada’s attitude towards Newfound-
land, and that Canada’s “interest in the place was really only to defend Canada.”
4
Over the next several days, letters and editorials appeared in several local and na-
tional newspapers either justifying Canada=s “Scorched Earth Policy” or condemn-
ing it.
5
Eventually, the uproar subsided but not the belief in the charge that Canada
secretly planned to burn St. John’s. In fact, this belief most recently appeared in a
book on the wartime Royal Newfoundland Constabulary.
6
This essay shows that,
while military planners did develop a plan to deny the Germans military facilities
and supplies if they captured St. John’s, not only did Canadian authorities have ab-
solutely no intention of destroying the city in the event of an attack, but the very
idea for such a plan actually originated with the Newfoundland government.
The winter of 1942 was one of the darkest periods of the Second World War.
The Japanese had smashed the American fleet at Pearl Harbor and were advancing
unchecked throughout the western Pacific. Rommel had the British on the ropes in
North Africa, and Hitler’s U-boats had moved across the Atlantic and were now
sinking ships within sight of land from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mex-
ico. By this time, Newfoundland was an armed camp; it hosted both American and
Canadian forces. Through an August 1940 agreement, Britain gave the United
States the right to construct bases on British territory in the Western hemisphere in
return for fifty surplus destroyers. As an attachment to this agreement, Britain also
offered the US bases in Bermuda and Newfoundland, “freely and without consider-
ation.” Ultimately, the United States stationed forces at St. John’s, Torbay, Arg-
entia, Gander, Stephenville and eventually Goose Bay, Labrador. The first Ameri-
cans arrived in St. John’s aboard the Edmund B. Alexander in January 1941. By
war’s end, tens of thousands of American servicemen had been stationed in New-
foundland and Labrador, and hundreds of thousands of US military personnel and
passengers had passed through the various US facilities throughout the colony.
7
Although less vivid in popular memory, the Canadians had arrived earlier — in
1940 — but in much smaller numbers. Ottawa had made a commitment to defend
Newfoundland even before Canada entered the war against Germany. Canada con-
sidered its neighbour an “essential Canadian interest,” and an important part of the
“Canadian orbit.” Despite the rhetoric of fraternity, the reality was that Newfound-
land possessed a number of military targets that were important to Canada: the air-
port at Gander, the trans-Atlantic seaplane base at Botwood, the iron ore mines on
Bell Island which provided one third of the ore for the steel mills of Cape Breton,
the numerous cable and wireless stations along the coast, and of course, the city of
St. John’s, the economic and political centre of Newfoundland. Furthermore, thanks
to its geographical position, Newfoundland was the “key to the gulf of Canada,”
and, “in many ways [its] first line of defence.”
8
Indeed, Newfoundland Governor
Humphrey Walwyn prefigured O=Flaherty’s sentiments that it was, “quite apparent




During the “Phoney War” in Europe, the Canadian government
did not act upon its commitment. Upon visiting Ottawa to discuss Canada’s defence
plans for Newfoundland, the Newfoundland-born Commissioner for Justice and
Defence, L.E. Emerson, was surprised to discover that no preparations at all had
been made.
10
In meetings with the Chief of the General Staff Major-General T.V.
Anderson, the head of the navy Rear-Admiral Percy Nelles, and RCAF Chief Air
Vice Marshal G.M. Croil, Emerson discovered that no instructions had been issued
relating to Newfoundland other than for the defence of Bell Island and those parts
of the coast that were important to the defence of Canada. No provisions had been
made to base anything in Newfoundland to protect the populous yet vulnerable
coast stretching from Cape Freels at the head of the Bonavista Peninsula to Cape
Race at the southern tip of the Avalon Peninsula. Emerson suggested basing recon-
naissance seaplanes at Bay Bulls or Trepassey on the Southern Shore, or even
somewhere in St. Mary’s Bay or Placentia Bay. The Canadians regretted that “they
did not have any planes to spare,” but did offer to train men to man the guns on Bell
Island.
11
That changed as the German Blitzkrieg swept through Western Europe. Ot-
tawa dispatched the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch of Canada to Botwood and
stationed five Douglas Digby bombers from RCAF No. 10 Squadron at Gander. By
the winter of 1942, the Canadian army had set up camp at Lester’s Field in St.
John’s. With the arrival of the Royal Canadian Navy and the creation of the New-
foundland Escort Force under the command of Commodore Leonard Murray in
May 1941, St. John’s became an important naval base. During the course of the
war, over 500 warships were stationed at St. John’s. During the same period, the
number of naval personnel serving at St. John’s rose from less than 1,000 in 1941
to more than 5,000 at war’s end.
12
This figure does not include the thousands of sail-
ors that crewed the 25 to 30 warships that were alongside the pier on any one day.
At about the same time that Canada decided to establish a naval base at St.
John’s, Ottawa also approved the construction of a Royal Canadian Air Force base
near the community of Torbay. Forces stationed there would provide harbour pro-
tection for St. John’s and Bell Island, and patrol the convoy routes east of New-
foundland. During the summer of 1941, Group Headquarters was established at St.
John’s under the command of Group Captain C.M. McEwen, and RCAF Station
Torbay opened in October 1941. Patrols were started when four Hudson bombers
from No. 2 (British) Squadron arrived from Dartmouth, Nova Scotia the following
month. From this point on, convoys were offered air cover as far as 600 kilometres
east. For anti-submarine sweeps and reconnaissance patrols using both Hudson and
Digby anti-submarine bombers, this was stretched to 1000 kilometres.
13
In light of
the dramatic increase in passenger traffic between Newfoundland and Canada, in
February 1942, the Newfoundland government approved the Canadian Govern-
ment’s request to open the Torbay airbase to a regular Trans-Canada Airline ser-
vice between the two dominions.
14
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It is not surprising that, after the German declaration of war on the United States,
local commanders became very concerned about a German raid on Newfoundland.
Indeed, the commander of the American ground forces in Newfoundland, Major-
General G.C. Brant, felt that such an attack was “not only possible at present, but
very probable.”
15
Even before this, US President Roosevelt expressed his concerns
to British Prime Minister Churchill as to the security of Newfoundland. In April
1941, he proposed sending an additional half battery of 8" guns, one squadron of 3
medium and 3 heavy bombers, and 57 officers and 575 men to Newfoundland to
bolster defences.
16
The fear was that, should the Germans get a foothold on the is-
land, the whole east coast of Canada and the United States would be open to naval
and air attack. U-boats operating from Newfoundland could sever the convoy
routes between North America and Great Britain, and the war in Europe would be
in jeopardy.
It did not take long for the U-boats to make their presence felt in the waters
around Newfoundland. In early February 1942, the Americans attacked “definite
sound contacts” in Placentia Bay, not far from their base at Argentia, and suspected
that two U-boats were patrolling the bay.
17
On 1 March, a patrol plane from Argentia
sighted and sank a U-boat forty kilometers south of Trepassey, the first American
U-boat kill of the war.
18
Two days later, the residents of St. John’s experienced three
heavy explosions in quick succession coming from the Narrows. That the explo-
sions were the result of torpedoes being fired at the entrance to St. John’s Harbour
was confirmed several days later.
19
Over the next six months, four ore carriers were
sunk off Bell Island, and the Sydney to Port aux Basques passenger ferry Caribou
was lost to a U-boat attack, all with heavy casualties.
20
Even though the battlefields
of Europe were thousands of miles away, there was no doubt that Newfoundland
was on the front lines.
Shortly after the Americans entered the war, local Canadian and American ser-
vice heads met with select Newfoundland Commission of Government members to
discuss defence arrangements for Newfoundland. The group concluded that any at-
tack would have to come from seaward and would take the form of air attack and/or
shore bombardment. Consequently, a comprehensive blackout regime was planned.
Commissioner of Defence Emerson proposed that a two week continuous blackout
be tried at the end of January 1942. Notice would be given in newspapers and the
regulations would cover the whole of St. John’s and surrounding area, including
Conception Bay. During the blackout, local radio stations would be asked to sus-
pend their broadcasts, so enemy forces could not use them to home in on their tar-
gets. The committee concluded that air raid shelters were impractical. First of all,
an effective shelter needed to be at least 9 metres underground to provide protection
against high explosive bombs, and St. John’s, for the most part, sits on solid rock.
Furthermore, any air assault would be seaborne and thus limited in size, and conse-
quently a sustained air attack was not anticipated. As radar had not yet been in-
stalled, the raid would probably be over before anyone could take shelter anyway.
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Thus, the committee felt that the main cause of casualties would be falling debris and
splinters. Experience in Britain showed that the best defence against this danger was
for people to stay in their homes, under stairs or in cupboards or pantries, and to tape
or board up windows. However, the committee thought that any attacking forces
would probably use incendiaries as opposed to high explosives, so fire posed the big-
gest danger.
21
Any attack on St. John’s would concentrate on shipping and harbour facilities.
However, as the city was built up around the harbour with mainly wooden buildings
and homes, any attack, especially with incendiaries, would pose a serious fire haz-
ard to the whole area. To combat this threat, the committee had at its disposal the lo-
cal Auxiliary Fire Service, the RCAF Fire Unit at Torbay and the US Fire Unit at Fort
Pepperell. In addition, homes and businesses would be encouraged to take their
own fire precautions including the provision of stirrup pumps and bags of sand. Fire
wardens would also be organized and called out in the event of an attack. One could
anticipate that any serious incursion would leave several thousand people home-
less. The Americans offered Camp Alexander as emergency accommodation for up
to 2000 people, as well as their facilities at Torbay and Argentia. Evacuees would
need to be fed and US military authorities also offered to furnish mobile kitchens to
feed both firefighters and those forced to evacuate their homes. To this end, food
supplies would have to be stockpiled. The committee hoped that the merchants of
St. John’s could be organized to arrange for the storage and distribution of food-
stuffs. In the meantime, homeowners would be asked to obtain several days worth
of essential supplies for an emergency. The meeting adjourned with arrangements
apparently well in hand.
22
Nevertheless, in February 1942, the British government
released copies of its secret Scorched Earth Policy to the governments of its various
colonial dependencies and dominions.
23
Faced with the very real possibility of an invasion of the United Kingdom in
1940, the British planned to leave nothing of value for the Germans. Their Scorched
Earth Policy called for the destruction of all Naval, Army, and Air Force installa-
tions, plus cable and telegraph stations, oil and gasoline stocks, food and raw mate-
rials, transportation facilities including harbour installations, mine workings and
equipment, plus all supplies of currency, stamps, securities and other valuable doc-
uments. The British plan stressed total destruction without consideration for recov-
ery after the enemy withdrew. Measures had to be “rigorously applied in practice”
and emphasized that the decision to implement them against private property,
“should not, repeat not” be left to the individuals involved. Large property owners
would be taken into the government’s confidence and assured that such a plan was a
worst case scenario only and that their properties would be destroyed only as a last
resort. On the subject of compensation, the instructions suggest that any sort of
award would have to wait until after the war had ended. On the other hand, in the
event that small property owners were uncooperative, provisions were made to
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requisition such properties before they were destroyed. This would allow payment
without setting a precedent of immediate compensation.
24
As had the other colonies and dominions, the Newfoundland Government re-
ceived a copy of the British plan. On 10 March 1942, a week after the torpedo attack
against St. John’s, Commissioner Emerson sent copies of a condensed version of
these instructions to all military commanders in St. John’s, plus the Director of
Civil Defence, Leonard Outerbridge. At the same time, he requested a meeting to
discuss formulation of a similar plan for Newfoundland.
25
This was a full ten days
before the Canadian War Cabinet approved its own release of the plan. Indeed, in-
structions were not forwarded to the Joint Services Sub-Committee Newfound-
land, or any other JSC, until 18 April.
26
Admiral Murray ordered his staff, under the
chair of Captain E.R. Mainguy, to draft a proposal for the destruction of the RCN fa-
cilities in Newfoundland. In May 1942, a committee composed of senior base offi-
cers met in Mainguy’s office to discuss a general Scorched Earth Policy. It was
decided that as most of the RCN buildings in St. John’s — the hospital, barracks, ad-
ministration and officers’ accommodation buildings — were made of wood, the
quickest way of destroying them would be fire. Similarly, fire was proposed for
most of the wharves, machine shops, dockyard and buildings on the South Side —
all except the buildings on the Marine Agencies wharf. The committee warned that
if these buildings were still being used as a magazine, the non-explosive material
should be smashed because fire could result in “the whole of St. John’s [being] flat-
tened if the explosives were detonated.” For the same reason, the underground
magazines would just have their roofs blown in. The valves on the South Side fuel
oil tanks would be opened, or their pipes would be smashed, and burned. There is no
mention of letting the fuel flow into the harbour, as was reported by The Ottawa Cit-
izen. All naval stores, stock, vehicles and harbour craft would also be burned. The
committee recommended that any merchant shipping that could not be evacuated
would be scuttled or burned, “taking into cooperation any other authorities as nec-
essary.”
27
The committee consulted throughout the summer and in September, Captain
Mainguy, now acting as interim Flag Officer Newfoundland Force, issued copies
of “Denial Plans — Naval Installations, Equipment and Supplies” to the other Ser-
vice heads. The title is very telling. Denial Plans are different from Scorched Earth
Plans and Mainguy’s instructions specifically referred to “Naval Installations,
Equipment and Supplies.” Nevertheless, the navy’s plans were comprehensive and
fraught with danger. Fire was still to be the main means of destruction. The RCN
buildings in St. John’s would be burned, the dockyards demolished using depth
charges, naval vehicles driven off wharves, and the harbour entrance sealed with
blockships. The authors repeated their concerns as to how best to destroy the naval
fuel and ordinance facilities on the south side of the harbour. The proposal for the
Imperial Oil fuel tanks was equally worrisome. The easiest and most effective
means of destroying the fuel stocks was simply to open or smash the valves and ig-
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nite the leaking fuel. However, the authors cautioned that if this were done, it could
“result in a fire, the extent of which cannot be gauged.” Even if the fuel was not ig-
nited and was simply contained behind the concrete retaining walls surrounding the
tanks, the authors cautioned, fire danger would still be great.
28
The RCN=s plan was primarily concerned with military assets. Indeed, instead
of planning to destroy St. John’s, the documents specifically warn of dangers to the
town and offered alternatives. A clear case of this was the destruction of the hun-
dreds of tonnes of ordinance stored in bunkers dug into the Southside Hills. The
navy’s plan stated that the easiest and most efficient means of destruction was to sim-
ply blow it up. However, recognizing that the ensuing explosion would demolish the
city, the authorities advised that the time-consuming process of removing and de-
stroying the fuses and/or pistols would accomplish the same end with less risk to the
city.
Some in the military establishment doubted the need for a Scorched Earth Pol-
icy at all. Eastern Air Command Chief of Staff, Air Vice Marshall F.V. Heakes ar-
gued that, “while the present scales of attack warrant a Denial Scheme, they do not
warrant a Scorched Earth Policy.” He further advised that “the less said about
‘Scorched Earth’ on the east coast, the better.”
29
The captain of the Port of St.
John’s, Captain C.M.R. Schwerdt, felt that other than the vital installations such as
the dockyards, workshops, and fuel and ordinance depots, there was really no “par-
ticular object in destroying the shore establishment.” While he recognized that con-
fidential documents should not fall into enemy hands, he felt that the “Naval
Accommodation, Administration and other buildings might just as well be left.” As
a matter of fact, Schwerdt felt that preventing an enemy landing and acts of sabo-
tage by Fifth Columnists was “more important than the completion of an effective
Scorched Earth Policy.”
30
Canadian authorities did not intend to burn St. John’s to the ground. A reading
of the archival record shows that the naval authorities only intended to deny the na-
val facilities to the Germans should they try to occupy the city. This was a prudent
and time-honoured tactic. The plans suggested the best ways to do this, but also
clearly stated the consequences of some of these measures. Neither was the plan de-
veloped nor introduced behind the backs of the Newfoundland government and
civil authorities. In truth, copies of notes on the British Scorched Earth Plan were
distributed to local service heads by the Newfoundland government a full month
before the Canadian government sent copies to its various commands. Further-
more, the local Director of Civil Defence was informed at the same time as the ser-
vice heads, and both the British plan and the Newfoundland government instruct-
ions clearly state that it was “necessary to take into confidence [the] representatives
of companies or other interests involved.” Ultimately, the policy was rescinded
shortly after D-Day when “the improved strategic situation” prompted the Chiefs
of Staff Committee in Ottawa to cancel the Scorched Earth Policy for both the At-
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lantic and Pacific coasts.
31
All copies of the policy were ordered destroyed, but
some survived to become the source of controversy fifty-four years later.
In fairness to LeBlanc, he probably did not actually read the Scorched Earth
documents, but instead relied on a piece by Kerry Badgley that appeared in the Li-
braries and Archives Canada magazine The Archivist.
32
Deliberately or not, Badg-
ley’s article does give the impression that Canadian authorities planned to torch St.
John’s in the event of a German threat during World War Two. Indeed, the smoking
gun, so to speak, as to Canada’s nefarious intent is a quote that appears in the article
whereby officers conclude that “owing to the large amount of wood used in the
buildings in St. John’s,” fire would be the best expedient to their destruction.
33
This
quote is taken — in isolation — from the minutes of the initial meeting in Capt.
Mainguy’s office in May 1942, and it is clear from the documents that the officers
involved were referring to the RCN buildings only.
34
Furthermore, when the quote
appeared in the Ottawa Citizen, it had changed slightly to the “building in St.
John’s” which evolved into “the building of St. John’s” by the time it appeared in
The Evening Telegram.
35
Thus, the RCN’s intentions of only destroying their own
facilities in the event of an attack transformed to encompass the whole of the city.
Whether the result of “Upper-Canadian arrogance” or tabloid journalism, the
reaction to Canada’s Second World War Scorched Earth Plan for St. John’s says
more about Newfoundlanders’ sensibilities and our relationship with Canada than
any chicanery on the latter’s part. Why else would a half-century old plan, hatched
during a very frightening period in history, cause such vitriol? No doubt every im-
portant maritime centre in the country had similar plans in place. Would the discov-
ery of those for Halifax, Sydney, St. John, NB or Vancouver cause a similar out-
rage? Probably not. And why was it that so many people — not only in Newfound-
land — believed the Ottawa Citizen’s report at face value? Neither Wells nor
O’Flaherty probably saw the actual documents, or even Badgley’sArchivist article.
Indeed, all the letters and editorials dealt with whether Canadian authorities were
justified in developing the plans, not whether the newspaper reports were accurate.
The worst of motives was accepted as truth because it validated the long held im-
pression that Canada has continually been duplicitous in its dealings with New-
foundland. Perhaps LeBlanc and Badgley, along with the editors at Archivist, the
Ottawa Citizen and the Evening Telegram were doing no more than exploiting the
sensationalism of the story without checking the facts. There are instances in New-
foundland’s history when its neighbour to the west has acted less than convivially,
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